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 A “J. Crew Maneuver” is a type of collateral-stripping event that transfers the value of a 
nearly insolvent company from the lender to the borrower. This concept matters to lenders 
because it exposes them to significant downside risk through the loss of hundreds of millions of 
pledged collateral. While credit analysts and debt lawyers have commented on the importance 
of preserving creditor value ex ante through lender-protective clauses embedded within debt 
documents, this paper breaks ground on empirically studying the determinants of these 
protective clauses known as “J. Crew Blockers”. I hypothesize that private equity backing, a 
contractionary credit environment, contractual “stickiness” and the presence of an innovative 
law firm all influence the likelihood of observing J. Crew Blockers in debt documents. Using a 
multiple regression analysis as my primary regression, I analyze 10,370 debt contracts to find 
that contractual stickiness is the greatest contributing factor to likelihood of J. Crew Blocker 




Corporate credit and indenture documents are highly technical legal documents that can 
be creatively manipulated to extract more value for one party at the expense of another party. 
Legal analysis of credit agreements is an active industry, with companies such as Covenant 
Review, Debtwire, S&P and Moody’s all finding their niche in protecting clients against legal 
actions from counterparties. One of the most recent creative manipulations of credit and 
indenture documents first occurred in 2016, when J. Crew transferred a significant portion of its 
already pledged intellectual property (“IP”) to an unrestricted subsidiary, which was then used 
to raise additional debt for the company. This action strips collateral, typically in the form of IP, 
from existing lenders. J. Crew’s collateral-stripping maneuver has sparked a broader trend that 
aims to protect equity investment at the lender’s expense. Instances of these collateral stripping 
events are becoming more common and occur at household names, such as Neiman Marcus and 
PetSmart. 2 While lenders can pursue ex post litigation, previous literature hypothesizes that 
more value can be preserved by including lender-protective clauses ex ante. 
Due to the infamy that J. Crew’s initial transfer garnered within the investing 
community, subsequent collateral stripping events have been coyly referred to as “J. Crew 
maneuvers” (“the Maneuver”) or even as “Getting J. Screwed”. Defensive legal provisions 
 
1 Thank you to all who have helped with the creation of this paper. To Peder Gram for introducing me to 
the concept of “Getting J. Screwed”. To Timothy Corprew, Ed Tolley and Anthony Ribal for their 
practitioner insights. Biggest thanks to Professor George Batta and Professor Janet Smith for providing 
substantial mentorship throughout the entire process. 
2 Among those listed, other examples include Cirque du Soleil, IHeartMedia, Travelport, Party City, 
Peabody Coal and Acosta. 
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within credit and indenture documents designed to prevent these Maneuvers have been coined 
“J. Crew blockers” (“Blockers”). All instances of the Maneuver have been initiated by private 
equity (“sponsor”) firms, who, in light of little to no recovery of their investment, began to enact 
increasingly risky strategies in order to preserve some shareholder value.3 
Understanding what factors go into drafting these defensive legal provisions has 
implications for lenders, who can face large and unexpected losses on their investments. 
Hypothetically, an aggressive asset-stripping event could dig a distressed company out of 
insolvency, but burdening an already struggling company with additional leverage decreases 
the firm’s expected value for both the equity holder and lender. So far, PetSmart’s decision to 
designate a part of its core intellectual property as an unrestricted subsidiary is the only case of 
a Maneuver saving a company from insolvency. Lenders must acknowledge that there is a 
tangible cost associated with leaving J. Crew Blockers out of debt contracts. In 2016, J Crew’s 
sponsors succeeded in transferring at least $250 million of already pledged collateral to an 
unrestricted subsidiary. As recently as July 2020, Neiman Marcus was forced to repay $172 
million to its unsecured claims committee (“UCC”) due to litigation related to a fraudulent J. 
Crew Maneuver.4 
Almost no literature exists on the presence of J Crew provisions within credit 
documents. My paper is the first that I am aware of that evaluates empirical determinants of the 
adoption of such a provision. While there is much literature on contract theory, attempts to 
quantify such theory is limited. Difficulties with collecting data on contracts and a lack of 
standardization across debt documents limits the results of empirical studies. This paper 
contributes to existing contract theory literature and to financial economics literature on agency 
cost, macroeconomic impacts on negotiating leverage, and professional network theory.  
 
Purpose of Paper 
The J Crew Maneuver is a recent development. While research firms such as Debtwire, 
Reorg and Covenant Review are actively studying the impact that this collateral stripping event 
has on its clients, there is still much analysis to be done. Despite current research, the market 
does not know how to price in Maneuvers. A debt instrument should trade lower on the 
secondary market if it loses a portion of its collateral. In J. Crew’s case, the price of its term loan 
 
3 A list of companies and their sponsors: J. Crew (TPG Capital, Leonard Green & Partners), Neiman 
Marcus (Ares), PetSmart (BC Partners), Cirque du Soleil (TPG), IHeartMedia (Bain Capital, Thomas H. 
Lee Partners), Travelport (Blackstone), Party City (Thomas H. Lee), Peabody Coal (Lehman Brothers 
Private Equity), Acosta (Pinebridge Capital). < https://www.capitaliq.com> accessed 20 November 2020. 
4 After Neiman Marcus filed for bankruptcy, activist distressed debt investor Marble Ridge Capital filed a 
suit claiming fraudulent transfer. The court found irrefutable evidence showing that Neiman Marcus 
executives engaged in a J. Crew Maneuver after being informed that the company was insolvent. Neiman 
settled with Marble Ridge and the rest of the Unsecured Creditor’s Committee for $172 million in stock. 
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actually rose on the news that more debt had been raised on previously pledged collateral.5 
PetSmart investors reacted much differently: price volatility of its term loan and unsecured 
bonds spiked significantly through a litigation and settlement process.6  
Despite the potential loss of value that can occur due to a Maneuver, presence of J. Crew 
Blockers in credit and indenture documents is extremely limited. S&P Leveraged Finance found 
that, despite the value-destructive nature of the Maneuver, fewer than 20 percent of its clients 
with significant amounts of material intellectual property had sampled Blocker language in its 
documents.7 
 For a sample of 10,370 debt contracts spanning January 1, 2017 to October 10, 2020, I 
employ a multiple linear regression and probit model to test hypotheses related to the 
probability of adopting Blocker language. I hypothesize that the inclusion of Blocker language 
in new credit and indenture documents may be positively correlated with the presence of a 
private equity firm, a contracting economic environment, increased contract negotiating costs, 
and the presence of innovative law firms. 
I construct my variables of interest in the following way: first, I include a variable that 
captures the presence of private equity backing. Second, I use the date that the United States 
declared a state of national emergency in response to the COVID-19 outbreak to identify the 
shift from an expansionary credit environment to the current contractionary credit 
environment. Third, I create a variable that determines whether a borrowing firm has sampled 
Blocker language in the past. Finally, I construct variables to determine whether a borrower 
employs law firms that are more likely to sample Blocker language.  
Getting J. Screwed is a type of agency cost. As an investment nears bankruptcy, an 
equity holder’s incentives diverge significantly from that of the debt holders (Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)). If the lenders did not expect these agency costs to materialize, they may not be 
adequately protected from incentive misalignment. Companies backed by private equity firms 
are more likely to experience financial distress due to higher levels of leverage. Additionally, 
the concentrated ownership structure inherent of private equity portfolio companies allows 
these firms to execute a Maneuver quickly. These issues are observed ex ante, and lenders will 
 
5 < https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-17/in-finance-j-crew-is-a-verb-it-means-to-stick-it-
to-a-lender> accessed 24 November 2020. 
6 Mengden (2020). 
7 The study sampled 120 credit agreements, representing roughly a third of the agreements executed and 
rated by S&P Global Ratings between early 2017 and February 2019. The study found that Blocker 
language was present in just 17 percent of retail agreements, 23 percent of technology, 13 percent of 
media, and 13 percent of consumer products. Overall, just 17 percent of all credit agreements sampled 
contained direct Blocker language. 
< https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/leveraged-loan-




want to negotiate in more downside protection into the contract, perhaps in the form of a 
Blocker. 
The pre-COVID expansionary credit environment may have subdued the development 
of Blockers in debt contracts, as increased competition amongst lenders has allowed borrowers 
to extract greater concessions from their counterparties. If this theory holds, J. Crew Blockers 
will be more common in debt documents signed after COVID, as economic contractions create 
greater need for liquidity on whatever terms borrowers can get. 
Contract completeness theory suggests that a tradeoff between linguistic accuracy and 
production efficiency, which keeps new language out of debt documents and incentivizes old 
language to stay in. In other words, a lender may think that negotiating in a Blocker is 
important to maintaining an adequate collateral base, but conclude that the negotiation will be 
cost-prohibitive. Once a Blocker is negotiated into a debt document, the opposite holds true: the 
borrower might want to take the language out, but believe that the cost of negotiation will be 
too high. I refer to this phenomenon as “contract stickiness”. If my hypothesis holds, contract 
stickiness will have an extremely high level of economic significance, suggesting that previous 
instances of Blocker language by the same borrower significantly increase the likelihood of 
Blocker language in future debt documents, because ink costs will strongly disincentivize 
negotiating parties to strike the existing Blocker clause.  
Finally, professional network theory might explain the lack of Blocker language in debt 
documents. J. Crew Blockers are a product of legal innovation. Academics suggest that financial 
and legal innovations are spread through professional networks, such as law firms, investment 
banks and members of the Board of Directors. This theory suggests that Blockers are not yet 
prevalent in the market because only a subset of innovative law firms are promoting their use. 
 To test these hypotheses, I use Intelligize to identify debt documents containing Blocker 
language through a process described in Section II. I then extract the existing universe of credit 
and indenture documents since 2017 from Intelligize. The data is combined with Compustat 
and the Moody’s ratings database to add information about company financial performance. 
The resulting dataset is then used in regressions to evaluate variables that affect the likelihood 
of Blocker language appearing in a debt instrument.  The final dataset consists of 10,370 
observations, including 33 debt documents that sample Blocker language. 
 Three of four findings are consistent with the hypotheses presented. In an OLS and 
probit regression, all key independent variables are statistically significant. The regressions 
provide evidence that private equity backing, a contracting credit environment, and legal 
networks all contribute marginally to the probability of Blocker language  
The most economically significant predictor of Blocker language is contract stickiness. 
While contract stickiness is the most significant indicator by an order of magnitude, the 
outcome seems to suggest that prior inclusion of Blocker language is more likely to increase 
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negotiating costs, not less. This conclusion is not overly surprising, and agrees with certain 
interpretations of previous literature on contract completeness. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. I first review existing literature on agency cost, contract 
completeness, macroeconomic impact on lender-protective clauses, and professional networks. 
Section II describes the data and variable construction used in the analysis. Section III provides 
empirical tests of the hypotheses. Section IV concludes and suggests areas for future research. 
 
I. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Agency Costs 
The J. Crew maneuver is a form of agency cost.8 Jenson and Meckling (1976) published a 
seminal paper on the development of agency costs called Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. They prove why shareholders will choose a set of 
suboptimal investment decisions in the presence of a mixed capital structure. Jensen and 
Meckling begin the paper by defining an agency relationship and associated agency costs. An 
agency relationship is “A contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision-making authority to the agent.” An agency cost is comprised of the sum of 
monitoring, bonding, and residual losses.  
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) acknowledge that minority shareholders will realize that the 
manager-owner’s incentives will diverge from that of the other shareholders, and the 
divergence will be manifested in a decline in share price that incorporates the monitoring costs 
and residual difference in incentives between the parties. This assumption relies heavily on the 
presence of efficient markets and a set of restrictive assumptions that does not incorporate the 
cost of gathering information. In this way, the paper does not reflect actual market behaviors 
but instead gleans insight into the world of theorems and models. The findings of Jensen et al. 
(1976) are too theoretical to fully explain pricing volatility that occurs during a Maneuver. 
 As the capital structure becomes increasingly burdened with risky debt, the actions of 
the agent significantly diverge from that of all stakeholders. Burdening a company with riskier 
debt incentivizes the manager-owner to undertake increasingly riskier investments that promise 
high payoffs if successful, even if the probability of payoff is low. If the investment succeeds, 
shareholders benefit from the residual claim. If the investment fails, creditors bear most of the 
loss. Engaging in higher variance investments transfers wealth from creditors to shareholders if 
creditors cannot prohibit the manager-owner’s actions. If creditors fully own the company, but 
 
8 There is an extensive literature on agency cost and optimal capital structure. While this paper covers 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1976) in detail, I recognize several other authors that inform the 
shape of this paper. These authors include Modigliani and Miller (1958), Bradley Jarrell and Kim (1984), 
Harris and Raviv (1991), Leland (1994), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and Jensen (2009).  
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the manger-owner has control over the operations and assets of the company, the manager-
owner has every incentive to engage in risky behaviors. Consider a company on the brink of 
insolvency: it will soon be owned by the creditors, yet is still run by the equity holders. If the 
company cannot yet be considered insolvent, a manager-owner’s actions do not constitute 
fraudulent activities.9 Figure 1 describes the incentive for rising agency costs. As the fraction of 
financing by outside claims grows, so does its agency cost. 
 




Myers (1976) expanded on the notion of agency costs as it relates to corporate borrowing 
later the same year. His suggestions rely heavily on the creation of defensive contractual 
provisions within credit documents that prohibit certain agency costs. These provisions are a 
form of monitoring costs. While the previous literature failed to explain why a shareholder 
would be willing to take on risky debt that would necessarily reduce the value of the overall 
firm, he posited that a rational manager-owner may assume the additional debt as long as the 
value destruction of the financing was less than or equal to the government-subsidized tax-
deductible interest on the financial instrument. This is one of the tenets of modern private 
equity investment: juice equity returns by reaping the benefit of tax-shielded interest payments. 
However, he goes on to argue that too much risky debt “creates situations ex post which 
management can serve shareholders’ interests by making sub-optimal decisions.” A Maneuver 
is one such example of ex post sub-optimal decision making, since the incentives of the manager-
 
9  As stated, this is only true if it can be argued that the company is still solvent. If the company is not 
solvent, then a transfer of wealth to shareholders is a fraudulent transfer. This occurred during the 
Neiman Marcus Maneuver, when the court found evidence that company executives had disregarded 
three independent valuations that all suggested that Neiman Marcus had a negative equity value. 
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owner of a nearly insolvent company is significantly misaligned with the incentives of its 
lenders. Such is the case of companies who attempt a J. Crew Maneuver. 
Myers (1976) presents a set of basic contractual provisions that prevent agency costs in 
the absence of monitoring costs. Myer’s first recommendation for a complete contract is to 
prohibit the manager-owner from investing in any NPV-negative projects. Ex ante, this 
provision is impractical because an investment’s payoff can only be known with certainty ex 
post. Creditors cannot rely on management’s expectations because management and creditor 
incentives have diverged. His second recommendation is to renegotiate the debt contract such 
that the contract re-aligns both party’s interests if an investment payoff differs from its expected 
payoff. He dismisses this recommendation due to the high cost of continual renegotiation 
between parties. Myer’s next recommendation is to shorten the maturity of debt such that 
creditors can renegotiate its terms before every major investment decision made by the firm. He 
similarly dismisses this idea based on monitoring costs. Myers’s final recommendation is to 
issue restrictive covenants, such as banning dividend payments in certain scenarios so the firm 
cannot sell certain assets and dividend out the return immediately before it goes bankrupt. He 
acknowledges that a company that cannot allow for dividends may necessarily be investing in 
NPV negative projects if no positive projects exist. 
J. Crew Maneuvers can help equity holders circumvent restrictive covenants. Although 
not described in Myers (1976), J. Crew Maneuvers also allow equity holders to legally engage in 
claim dilution. Claim dilution is described in Smith and Warner (1979), and constitutes a 
situation where a bondholder’s claim on the assets is reduced by issuing additional debt with 
the same or higher priority. Dividend restrictions and anti-dilution clauses are both common 
practice in the modern-day lending market. Under normal circumstances, the outright sale of 
core intellectual property followed by an immediate dividend of the proceeds ahead of a 
bankruptcy would be strictly prohibited by a company’s debt documents. So would re-pledging 
already secured collateral. Both acts represent ethically murky decisions made by management 
that would not normally occur outside a situation of near solvency (Jensen (2009)). The 
Maneuver exploits a loophole present within incomplete contracts that allows for equity holders 
to increase its investment at the expense of the creditors. 
 
Contract Completeness 
 Contract completeness is defined as, “One which specifies the rights and duties of each 
party in every state of the world” (Ganglmair and Wardlaw (2017)). In an ideal world, a J. Crew 
maneuver would either not be able to happen because the debt contract would prohibit it, or the 
Maneuver would already be priced in. Contract completeness is hard to quantify because 
contracts are a complex nexus of unstandardized clauses. A lack of standardization across 
10 
 
contracts makes formal empirical analyses difficult, which explains why the area is generally 
under-researched.10 
Ganglmair and Wardlaw (2017) analyze the level of contract similarity, finding that 
more complex contracts are correlated with greater default risk, uncertainty, capital structure 
complexity, and likelihood of renegotiation. They find that larger contracts have greater levels 
of standardization and that borrowers, not lenders, are the greatest indicator of similarity 
within credit agreements. As a result of this finding, Ganglmair et al. strongly rejects the 
concept the existence of boilerplate language, which is a hotly contested conclusion.  Their 
method for measuring complexity is rudimentary. Ganglmair et al. (2017) uses a simple word 
and sentence count of the credit agreement, arguing that a credit provision’s complexity is a 
function of its length. While they recognize that this estimate is noisy, they accept this tradeoff 
since their metrics are easy to understand and appear to be a reasonable proxy for complexity. 
Ganglmair et al. concludes by positing that a lack of contract completeness may be more 
favorable than that of a complete contract in the presence of monitoring costs, including ink 
costs, which is defined as the “time and lost value inherent in specifying [contractual] 
contingencies” (Ganglmair et al. (2017)). Contract incompleteness leaves both explicit and 
implied contract terms, which the latter’s interpretation can reasonably be disagreed upon 
(Goetz and Scott (1985)).  
Choi, Gulati and Scott (2020) further expand on ink costs through a term they call 
encrustation, which is a concept used to describe cut-and-paste “boilerplate” language that may 
once have had a meaning in a previous contract, but no longer serves a practical purpose and 
may in fact hurt parties in ex post litigation. Encrustation is consistent with the Ganglmair et al. 
(2017) observation that incomplete contracts may add more value to both parties than complete 
contracts. By using language previously used in old credit documents verbatim, the firm is 
cutting down on the amount of ink costs associated with drafting the contract. A tradeoff exists 
between linguistic accuracy and production efficiency. Choi et al. (2020) hypothesizes that 
greater encrustation exists in credit documents where more agency costs are present. They 
present a spectrum of legal documents, from mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) contracts to 
sovereign bond contracts, showing that a higher level of agency costs correlates to greater 
amounts of boilerplate language. M&A contracts, they argue, should have the least amount of 
encrustation since one manager-owner is negotiating with another manager-owner. Conversely, 
sovereign bonds have the greatest level of encrustation since they are issued by the state (an 
agent of its people) to many lenders. The number of lenders is also associated with greater 
encrustation because the ink costs of negotiating fine details with many lenders is significantly 
higher than the cost of negotiating with just one lender. Choi et al. (2020) summarizes their 
point through a metaphor: “one might think of the attorneys who draft M&A contracts as 
 
10 While empirical research on contract completeness is under-studied, theory is not. Much theory exists 
on the topic of contract completeness. Prominent academics include Oliver Hart, Edward Green, Stephen 
Spear and Sanjay Srivastava. 
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artisans and the bond lawyers who issue standard boilerplate as workers on an assembly line”. 
Private equity-backed debt documents bear less agency cost than sovereign bonds, but more 
than M&A contracts. A debt document’s increased ink costs relative to M&A contracts may 
explain why Blocker language is included in so few documents. Blocker language may also be 
more susceptible to encrustation, as renegotiation of the clause becomes cost-prohibitive. 
As previously discussed, credit contracts are highly complex and unique to each 
borrower and situation. The borrower and lender are at liberty to define any concept as they 
wish. This presents an issue in empirical literature. Badawi and de Fontenay (2019) recognize 
these unique contractual definitions and argue that the existing academic literature does not 
properly accommodate for changes across certain definitions, leading to an oversimplification 
of analysis within the academic community. Their primary concern is with the definition of 
EBITDA, which has diverged materially from actual Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation and Amortization. Definitions of EBITDA have expanded significantly, 
particularly since the Federal Reserve periodically capped the leverage a bank can loan to a 
company at 6:1.11 To circumvent these regulatory restrictions, borrowers and lenders have 
simply allowed for more permissive EBITDA definitions that may or may not actually represent 
the company’s cash flow. These overblown definitions of EBITDA have been primarily driven 
by private equity-backed firms, however non-private equity backed companies are also 
benefitting from the relaxation of traditional measures of EBITDA.12 A negative relationship 
exists between permissiveness of EBITDA and covenants, however, in the case of sponsor-
backed companies, these covenants have many carve-outs that create an environment in which 
J. Crew Blockers may exist.  
 
Macroeconomic Impact on Lender-Protective Clauses 
The loosening of sponsor-backed covenants is also a function of a pre-COVID 
expansionary credit environment that heavily favored borrowers over lenders. Roberts and Sufi 
(2009) suggest that debt covenant permissiveness is tied to major structural changes in the debt 
markets, implying that an exogenous negative economic shock (such as a pandemic) may 
tighten the status quo of loose covenants and creative EBITDA definitions. Other research 
similarly finds that a negative credit cycle is correlated with lenders receiving greater collateral 
packages and stricter contractual terms (Jimenez, Salas and Saurina (2006).  
 Mengen (2020) finds evidence that the post-COVID contractionary credit environment 
increases the likelihood of Blocker language within new debt documents, citing that lenders of 
multiple large retail, travel and entertainment companies have successfully negotiated J. Crew 
 
11 According to Badawi et el. (2019), the Federal Reserve decided to drop the guidance in 2018, as it was 
discovered that while leveraged lending by banks had decreased, leveraged lending by non-bank 
institutions increased substantially, creating an uncertain level of overall risk for the financial sector. 
12 Mengden (2020). 
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Blockers into their credit agreements after liquidity in the debt markets dried up during March 
2020. Mengden argues that the pre-COVID credit cycle created the catalyst for J. Crew 
Maneuvers by allowing for expansive EBITDA definitions, historically loose covenants, and 
questionable asset valuations. He claims that loose EBITDA definitions are particularly 
dangerous and suggests that instead, credit documents should renegotiate tighter covenants 
and EBITDA definitions with looser ratios. Mengden does not acknowledge that this thesis, 
while hypothetically beneficial to the lender, was impractical for the majority of the last decade 
due to the 2013 Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending. While ex post litigation will 
always be a possibility, Mengden (2020) suggests that it is less efficient than ex ante 
renegotiation of credit agreements. 
A J. Crew Maneuver is just one of many aggressive tactics that equity investors employ 
to stay in control of their investment. Borrowers have been observed to bend accounting rules 
when they find themselves close to breaching a covenant, and companies adopt more flexible 
accounting practices and engage in aggressive manipulation of accruals to keep a technical 
default at bay (Sweeny (1994); DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994)). Borrowers have a reason to be 
afraid of breaching a financial covenant: a violation is strongly correlated with a sharp 
reduction in company investment, especially in the presence of agency and information 
problems (Chava and Roberts (2008)). 
Coates, Palia and Wu (2019) examine contract completeness within M&A contracts by 
assessing how bidder and target protective clauses affects abnormal returns and likelihood of 
deal completion. They found that bidder protective clauses empirically lead to higher abnormal 
returns for the bidder, however with a lower completion rate. A target will have a lower 
incentive to accept a bid if it gives more power to the bidder. The Coates et al. finding can likely 
be extended to the credit market. A lender demanding prohibitive covenants or tight Earnings 
Before Interest, Taxes and Depreciation (“EBITDA”) definitions will possibly be disregarded in 
favor of a lender willing to provide a covenant-lite loan. 
 
Professional Networks 
 Research suggests that financial and legal innovations spread through professional 
networks such as law firms, financial firms and Board of Director positions. Dechow and Tan 
(2020) suggest that professional networks are linked with innovation of accounting practices. 
Armstrong and Larcker (2009) suggest that board members spread certain accounting practices, 
and Bizjak, Lemmon and Whitby (2009) suggest that accounting practices spread through 
geographic link. Other academics have focused on the way that lawyers influence earnings 
quality and other corporate practices. Kwak, Ro and Suk (2012) suggest that corporate 
disclosures are materially influenced when one of the top management team members includes 
a lawyer. Since Blockers are a form of legal innovation, their presence may be spread 




Application of Literature 
I draw my hypotheses from the authors stated above. Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Myers (1976) and Jensen (2009) all inform my hypothesis on private equity involvement. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) indicates that increasing levels of risky debt increases agency cost. Myers 
(1976) recommends contractual provisions that allow for the presence of beneficial risky debt 
while also mitigating agency costs through monitoring and bonding. Jensen (2009) suggests that 
an increasingly insolvent company will take highly risky and unorthodox maneuvers to shift 
value from the lender to the borrower. My hypothesis on Blocker inclusion and the credit cycle 
stems from other observed instances of macroeconomic conditions and their impact on lender-
protective clauses (Roberts and Sufi (2009); Jimenez et al. (2006)). Choi et al. (2020) informs my 
hypothesis that ink costs for debt documents will incentivize Blocker language to be sticky, as 
debt documents are more “assembly line” than their “artisan” M&A counterparts. The 
Ganglmair and Wardlaw (2017) paper suggests that as ink costs go up, likelihood of successful 
negotiation goes down, leaving greater amounts of implied, rather than explicit terms (Goetz 
and Scott (1985)). 
 
II. DATA AND SAMPLE 
The Data 
I use several databases to construct my sample. Intelligize provides information on SEC-
registered debt documents. Using this information, I extract the entire universe of relevant debt 
documents and identify which contracts contain Blocker language. Compustat adds financial 
metrics for companies in the sample. Moody’s Default and Recovery Database is used to extract 
ratings information for companies included in the sample. 
 Language found in debt documents is highly variable across contracts. As a result, hand 
extraction of documents containing Blocker language is an imperfect, time intensive process 
that generally requires legal training. Due to the limited time and lack of legal knowledge, I 
used several supporting resources to identify the entire universe of documents containing 
Blocker language as accurately as I could. I first tried requesting existing data from Covenant 
Review and S&P but was informed that the information was proprietary. With the easiest 
option ruled out, whitepapers and other publicly available information became the best avenue 
for identifying specific language. Justin Smith, Debtwire Managing Director, provides some 
clarity on commonalities between Blocker-inclusive documents in his whitepaper, J Crew 
Blocker: Don’t Believe the Hype. He delineates six examples of Blocker language included in debt 
documents.13 In Reorg Research’s Covenant Conversations, Peter Washkowitz, Head of Reorg 
 




Covenants, gives the names of multiple companies with Blockers in place.14 Cross-referencing 
the language used in the Debtwire article with the companies discussed in the Reorg podcast, I 
was able to identify specific Blocker language used in each credit document. I inputted the 
specific Blocker phrases in the Intelligize search function to yield 79 unique contracts containing 
Blocker language. To assure that the information was fairly accurate, I contacted a senior 
member of S&P’s Leveraged Finance team, who confirmed the validity of my search. Once I 
could no longer identify more contracts with Blocker language, I extracted the entire universe of 
credit and indenture agreements from January 1, 2017 to October 15, 2020. The initial sample 
contains 31,308 debt documents. After filtering for relevant industries using SIC codes, the 
sample is reduced to 20,994 documents. Removing documents without dates yields 18,395 
credit and indenture agreements. 
 
Issues with the Collection Process 
 Imperfections exist within the dataset. It is likely that I have not identified the entire 
universe of publicly filed debt documents that contain Blocker language due to the issues stated 
in the previous section. Additionally, I could not reduce my sample size based on industry. 
Intelligize uses Standard Industrial Classification (“SIC”) codes to identify a company’s 
industry, which did not prove to be an accurate way to filter for Blocker-heavy industries. 
Borrowers with a large concentration of intellectual property are most likely to engage in 
stripping collateral from its lenders, although my sample did not reflect this fact.15 It might be 
reasonably assumed that IP-heavy industries should be mostly included under Life Sciences or 
Technology, but just as many documents with Blockers are associated with Manufacturing and 
Trade and Services. See table 1 for the distribution of blockers amongst SIC codes. Given the 
distribution of industries containing Blockers, the final sample includes debt documents from 







can/id1326289731?i=1000493786054> accessed 20 November 2020. 
15 Public documentation of J. Crew Maneuvers indicates that IP-heavy industries are more susceptible to 
an asset stripping event, however I could not find a good explanation of why. In my conversation with 
the senior member of S&P, he mentioned that restrictions typically exist for “hard assets”, but not 




Table 1: Distribution of Both Blocker-Specific Contracts and All Contracts by Industry 
This table presents the number and frequency of contracts by industry, broken up by Blocker identification. 
  Blockers Contracts (All)   
Industry Number Frequency Number Frequency ▲ Frequency   
Manufacturing 16 21.1% 3688 20.0% 1.0% 
Trade & Services 20 26.3% 4181 22.7% 3.6% 
Technology 20 26.3% 3006 16.3% 10.0% 
Real Estate & Construction 7 9.2% 3222 17.5% -8.3% 
Life Sciences 13 17.1% 4298 23.4% -6.3% 
Total 76 100.0% 18395 100.0% 0.0% 
 
 As expected, the Office of Technology has a much higher frequency of Blocker contracts 
than the general contract pool. But counter-intuitively, the Office of Life Sciences shows a lower 
than average frequency of Blocker contracts. Also, the Office of Manufacturing contains a higher 
frequency of Blocker contracts than the general population. One would think that 
manufacturing, an asset-intensive industry, would be underweighted to Blocker contracts 
relative to other, higher-IP industries. It seems reasonable to include the Offices of 
Manufacturing, Trade & Services, and Real Estate & Construction in the analysis. 
 
Key Independent Variables 
The goal of this study is to understand how private equity involvement, credit cycles, 
contract stickiness, and professional networks influence the presence of Blocker language. 
Presence of a private equity firm indicates the marriage of excessive leverage and a highly 
concentrated ownership that can carry out its intentions quickly, causing a divergence between 
manager-owner actions and lender desires. The US’s declaration of a national emergency 
indicates whether the debt document was initiated in an expansionary or contractionary credit 
environment, since the COVID-19 pandemic was immediately followed by a sharp economic 
decline. Contract stickiness is determined by whether a given firm has employed Blocker 
language in a previous debt document. Professional networks are determined by identifying 
whether companies that have included at least one instance of Blocker language in their debt 
documents are connected by a similar law firm. I include the variable “PE Backed” to indicate 
whether a company benefits from a private equity investment. The variable takes a value of one 
if information on an acquiring law or financial firm is present, and a zero if absent. To assess 
whether the contract was negotiated in a contractionary credit environment, I include a dummy 
variable called “COVID”. COVID takes the value of one if the contract was initiated on or after 
March 13, 2020, the day that President Donald Trump declared a state of national emergency 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and gives a value of zero if the contract was initiated before the 
declaration. “Sticky” identifies debt documents employed by a given company that are 
preceded by at least one prior document containing Blocker language. Intelligize provides 
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information on a company’s choice of law firm. “Top Law” refers to one of the top ten law firms 
that are associated with companies that sample Blocker language in at least one of their 
documents. Top Law takes a value of one in the presence of one of these ten law firms and a 
zero otherwise.  
I anticipate that all key independent variables will have a positive contribution to the 
likelihood that a given debt document samples Blocker language. Private equity backing 
increases agency cost and firm-level decision-making ability ex ante, which in turn increases the 
likelihood that lenders will include more clauses protecting them from downside scenarios. 
Since a contractionary environment shifts bargaining power to lenders, contracts initiated after 
COVID will likely have greater lender-protective clauses, including a Blocker clause. Contract 
stickiness will increase the likelihood of Blocker language, as the ink cost of negotiating a 
Blocker out of the contract may be too high for the borrower. Finally, the presence of a law firm 
linked to multiple companies with Blocker contracts should indicate a higher likelihood of 
Blocker language in other borrowers using the same law firms. 
 
Control Variables 
I use the Compustat database to introduce additional control variables. Controls derived 
from Compustat include the natural log of revenue, net income scaled to total assets (“ROA”), 
and industry-weighted leverage. I define leverage as total debt to EBITDA. Industry-weighted 
leverage is intended to be a control for default probability, as it is assumed that companies 
within the same industry will have roughly the same level of cash flow stability, and healthy 
companies will therefore choose an average level of industry leverage. “Industry Weighted 
Leverage” is defined as the leverage of the individual company, minus the average leverage per 
SIC code of the Intelligize database. “Ln(Revenue)” is used as a control for size, and “ROA” is 
used as a control for operating performance. Moody’s ratings are then added into the dataset as 
an additional control for default probability. I use “Speculative” to indicate whether Moody’s 
has issued the company a speculative rating, assigning a value of one if present and a zero if 
otherwise. “Doc Type” is also included, which takes a value of one if the document is an 
indenture, to control for the possible differences between indenture and credit documents. 
Dummy variables for industries are included.  
Information on both professional relationships and credit ratings are spotty, and 
reducing the sample to observations where either set of information is always present would 
produce inconclusive results. As such, both Top Law and Speculative have been transformed 
into interaction terms, where the a one indicates the presence of a rating or relationship, but a 
zero does not necessarily indicate its absence, since it may simply mean that the information 
does not exist within this dataset. I include dummy variables “Law Info” and “Moody’s” that 
indicate whether the information exists, where a one indicates the presence of information, and 
a zero otherwise. The final dataset is the inner join of the Intelligize and Compustat databases. 
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10,370 observations remain, including 33 observations that sample Blocker language. Summary 
statistics for all variables are included in table 2. 
The estimate for Top Law is noisy. Many companies with law firm information had 
multiple law firms listed, and it is unclear as to which of these law firms represented the 
company in a debt contract negotiation. It is entirely possible that the top law firms identified in 
this paper had no say in what was drafted into the borrower’s debt documents. Further, the law 
firm truly of interest is not the borrower’s law firm, but rather the lender’s law firm, since it 
assumed that the lender is pushing for the inclusion of Blocker language, not the other way 
around. It may be reasonable to assume that a borrower’s law firm may have a significant say in 
the inclusion of Blocker language, as they are responsible for arguing these provisions out, 
although this changes variable’s interpretation. Instead of being the top ten most innovative law 
firms, the output seems to suggest that these law firms are the most likely to be permissive of 
Blocker language. I keep this variable because I believe it may still have some explanatory 
power in the regression despite its noise. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for continuous and non-continuous variables are provided in table 
2. The dataset is broken up into Blocker and non-Blocker observations to show how each 
population is represented in the dataset. All variables of interest – PE Backed, COVID, Sticky 
and Top Law – are observed more frequently in Blockers documents than they are when no 














Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for non-continuous and continuous variables, broken up by Blocker 
identification. (Blockers = 33, Non-Blockers = 10,337) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for non-continuous variables 
    Percentage of Sample 
Variable  Blocker Language No Blocker Language 
COVID  0.182  0.036  
Doc Type  0.182  0.262  
Law Info  0.818  0.350  
Life Sciences  0.061  0.206  
Moodys  0.091  0.067  
PE Backed  0.212  0.051  
Real Estate  0.091  0.102  
Speculative  0.091  0.047  
Sticky  0.242  0.002  
Technology  0.212  0.182  
Top Law  0.601  0.105  
Trade Services  0.333  0.166  
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for continuous variables. 
 Min Max Mean Median Std. Dev 
A. Blocker Observations     
ROA -0.41 0.15 -0.08 -0.04 0.15 
Weighted Leverage -20.90 28.86 3.62 -2.76 10.47 
Ln(Revenue) 4.65 9.53 7.47 7.41 1.48 
B. Non-Blocker Observations    
ROA -46.87 0.46 -0.11 0.01 1.14 
Weighted Leverage -30.32 36.11 -0.02 -0.05 6.10 










III. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
I begin by using an OLS regression to establish a correlation between the model’s 
explanatory variables and the presence of a Blocker. I then include a probit model to assess how 
a non-linear predictive model changes the interpretation of my findings. 
 
OLS Regression 
Model (1) uses OLS regression analysis to determine whether being a borrower backed 
by a private equity firm increases the probability that the company will include Blocker 
language. Models (2), (3), and (4) examine the effects that COVID, contract stickiness and law 
firm links have on the inclusion of Blocker language, respectively. Finally, in model (5), I 
examine all effects simultaneously. Each firm i that initiates any number of contracts c on date t 
is included in the following regressions. Results are presented in table 4. 
 
Blockeri,t,c = α + β PE Backedi+ γ Controlsi,t + ε (1) 
Blockeri,t,c = α + β COVID+ γ Controlsi,t + ε (2) 
Blockeri,t,c = α + β Stickyi,t,c+ γ Controlsi,t + ε (3) 
Blockeri,t,c = α + β Law Firmi+ γ Controlsi,t + ε (4) 
















Table 3: Linear Regressions of Blocker Inclusion Rates and Key Independent Variables 
This table reports the OLS regression results for a sample of credit and indenture documents from January 2017 to 
October 2020. The dependent variable is the presence of Blocker language within a given document. All independent 
variables are defined in Section II. ***, **, * indicate that the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at 
the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.  
  Dependent Variable: Inclusion of Blocker 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.00162  0.00207  0.00231  0.00262  0.00165  
  (0.00210) (0.00209) (0.00190) (0.00209) (0.00204) 
Key indempend     
PE Backed 0.00842***    0.00813*** 
 (0.00227)    (0.00221) 
COVID  0.01263***   0.01149*** 
  (0.00294)   (0.00285) 
Sticky   0.2402***  0.2367*** 
   (0.00923)  (0.00938) 
Professional Relationships     
Law Info    0.00174  0.00143 
    (0.00129) (0.00126) 
Top Law    0.001533*** 0.01379***  
        (0.00199) (0.00193) 
Control Variables     
ROA -0.00026  -0.00019  -0.00007  -0.00017  -0.00005  
 (0.00050) (0.00051) (0.00045) (0.00050) (0.00049) 
Doc Type 0.00163  -0.00229  -0.00345  0.00019  0.00024  
 (0.00133) (0.00132) (0.00120) (0.00137) (0.00133) 
Speculative 0.00645  0.00561  0.00394  0.00272  0.00231  
 (0.00429) (0.00428) (0.00682) (0.00429) (0.00416) 
Weighted Leverage 0.00029*** 0.00028** 0.00035***  0.00027***  0.00032***  
 (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00008) 0.00008 (0.00008) 
ln(Revenue) 0.00033  0.00027  0.00013  -0.00011  -0.00029  
 (0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00024) (0.00027) (0.00026) 
Moody's -0.00476  -0.00326  -0.00199  -0.00244  -0.00162  
 (0.00363) (0.00362) (0.00324) (0.00361) (0.00351) 
Industry      
(Manufacturing)     
Trade & Services -0.00024  -0.00056  -0.00053 -0.00047  0.00047  
 (0.00152) (0.00152) 0.00139 (0.00152) (0.00147) 
Technology -0.00024  -0.00008  0.00016  -0.00063  0.00010  
 (0.00168) (0.00168) (0.00153) (0.00168) (0.00163) 
Real Estate & 
Construction -0.00186  -0.00047  0.00004  -0.00124  -0.00061  
 (0.00197) (0.00196) (0.00176) (0.00196) (0.00192) 
Life Sciences -0.00274  -0.00245  -0.00144  -0.00295  -0.00129  
  (0.00167) (0.00167) (0.00151) (0.00166) (0.00162) 
Number of Observations       10,370  10,370 10,370 10,370 10,370 





I find that all regressions show a positive and statistically significant relationship with 
the inclusion of Blocker language. Model (1) suggests that the presence of private equity 
backing increases the likelihood of Blocker language by 0.84 percent (p<0.01). Model (2) 
suggests that contracts drafted during the COVID contractionary credit environment increases 
the likelihood of Blocker language by 1.26 percent (p<0.01). Model (3) proposes that the 
presence of Blocker language in former contracts increases the likelihood of Blocker language 
by 24.02 percent (p<0.01). Model (4) proposes that using a law firm that has other clients who 
have instituted Blockers increases the likelihood of Blocker language by 0.15 percent (p<0.01). 
Model (5) suggests that neither statistical nor economic significance erodes when all 
determinants of interest are included simultaneously. Weighted leverage remains statistically 
significant across all models, suggesting that a one-point increase in leverage is associated with 




 I also include a probit marginal effects model of the regressions above as a robustness 
check on my results. Each firm i that initiates any number of contracts c on date t is included in 
the following regressions. I use the term “mfx” to describe the marginal effect within a given 
regression. Results are presented in table 4. 
mfx(probit(Blockeri,t,c)) = α + β PE Backedi+ γ Controlsi,t + ε (6) 
mfx(probit(Blockeri,t,c)) = α + β COVID+ γ Controlsi,t + ε (7) 
mfx(probit(Blockeri,t,c)) = α + β Stickyi,t,c+ γ Controlsi,t + ε (8) 
mfx(probit(Blockeri,t,c)) = α + β Law Firmi+ γ Controlsi,t + ε (9) 













Table 4. Probit Marginal Effects Regressions of Blocker Inclusion Rates and Key 
Independent Variables 
This table reports the probit marginal effects regression results for a sample of credit and indenture documents from 
January 2017 to October 2020. The dependent variable is the presence of Blocker language within a given document. 
All independent variables are defined in the Section II. ***, **, * indicate that the parameter estimate is significantly 
different from zero at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.  
  Dependent Variable: Inclusion of Blocker 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept  NA   NA   NA   NA   NA  
 (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) 
Key Independent Variables    
PE Backed 0.0050***    0.0041*** 
 (0.00170)    (0.00160) 
COVID  0.0055***   0.0058*** 
  (0.00180)   (0.00170) 
Sticky   0.0177***  0.015*** 
   (0.00330)  (0.00280) 
Professional Relationships     
Law Info    0.003* 0.0035** 
    (0.00160) (0.00160) 
Top Law    0.0059*** 0.0048*** 
        (0.00160) (0.00140) 
Control Variables     
ROA -0.00020  -0.00020  -0.00010  -0.00020  -0.00010  
 (0.00040) (0.00040) (0.00050) (0.00040) (0.00060) 
Doc Type -0.00190  -0.0028* -0.00220  0.00050  0.00090  
 (0.00150) (0.00150) (0.00140) (0.00140) (0.00140) 
Speculative 0.03260  0.03070  0.02760  0.02880  0.02320  
 (0.92930) (0.96430) (1.38190) (1.36180) (1.13880) 
Weighted Leverage 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) 
ln(Revenue) 0.00050  0.00040  0.00030  0.00000  -0.00020  
 (0.00030) (0.00030) (0.00030) (0.00030) (0.00030) 
Moody's -0.03130  -0.02870  -0.02670  -0.02850  -0.02230  
 (0.92920) (0.96430) (1.38190) (1.36180) (1.13880) 
Industry      
(Manufacturing)     
Trade & Services 0.00010  -0.00040  0.00090  0.00020  0.00030  
 (0.00140) (0.00140) (0.00140) (0.00140) (0.00130) 
Technology 0.00020  0.00010  0.00100  -0.00060  0.00030  
 (0.00160) (0.00160) (0.00150) (0.00160) (0.00150) 
Real Estate & 
Construction -0.00160  -0.00080  -0.00170  -0.00160  -0.00190  
 (0.00220) (0.00210) (0.00240) (0.00220) (0.00230) 
Life Sciences -0.0039* -0.00370  -0.00220  -0.0043* -0.00240  
  (0.00230) (0.00230) (0.00210) (0.00240) (0.00210) 
Number of Observations       10,370 10,370 10,370 10,370 10,370 




All key independent variables are deemed to be statistically significant, however the 
level of economic significance is unclear. The issue may stem from a scarcity of Blocker 
observations leading to a lack of explanatory power in both models.16 The probit model 
confirmed the results of the OLS model, although with less economic significance. Model (6) 
suggests that the presence of private equity backing increases the likelihood of Blocker language 
by 0.50 percent (p<0.01). Model (7) suggests that contracts drafted during the COVID 
contractionary credit environment increases the likelihood of Blocker language by 0.55 percent 
(p<0.01). Model (8) proposes that the presence of Blocker language in former contracts increases 
the likelihood of Blocker language by 1.77 percent (p<0.01). Model (9) proposes that using a law 
firm that has other clients who have instituted Blockers increases the likelihood of Blocker 
language by 0.59 percent (p<0.01). Model (10) suggests that neither statistical nor economic 
significance erodes when all determinants of interest are included simultaneously. Weighted 
leverage remains statistically significant across all models, suggesting that a one-point increase 
in leverage is associated with a 0.02 percent increase in likelihood that Blocker language is 
included within a debt document (p<0.01). Law Info becomes statistically significant, suggesting 
that the inclusion of law information increases the probability of Blocker inclusion by 0.35 
percent (p<0.05). 
 
Analysis of Results 
Private equity backing leads to a higher probability of observing Blocker language 
within a debt document, which is consistent with agency cost theory, especially within 
scenarios of an overvalued equity stake (Jensen (2009)). My findings support the thesis 
provided by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1976), since a higher observed level of 
agency cost within private equity portfolio companies seems to lead to stronger lender 
protective covenants. A lender can protect against a downside scenario by spending additional 
upfront inking costs to assure that different forms of agency costs, such as a J. Crew Maneuver, 
does not occur. The directionality and statistical significance of Industry Weighted Leverage 
also supports the agency cost thesis, implying that an increase in industry-weighted leverage 
increases the likelihood of the inclusion of Blocker language. Both effects remain statistically 
significant for the probit model, however its economic significance is dampened. 
The link between credit environment and Blocker language holds as hypothesized for 
both OLS and probit. This finding supports that of the Roberts and Sufi (2009), Jimenez et al. 
(2006) and Hackbarth et al. (2006) conclusions, pointing toward tighter covenant definitions, 
 
16 While no model should “fit the noise”, a linear model is likely too rigid to be used with a small number 
of Blocker observations. Similarly, probit marginal effects will likely yield little result by construction. 
Marginal effects holds all independent variables constant at the mean. Since Blockers are found in the 




ratios, and collateral requirements during times of credit contraction. Assuming the Coates et al. 
(2019) finding holds for credit contracts, a lender who used the contracting credit environment 
to extract favorable concessions from the borrower may realize an outsized return over the 
course of its investment. 
Contract stickiness is by far the most economically and statistically significant indicator 
of Blocker language, however its relative lack of predictive power is surprising. The OLS 
regression suggests that contract stickiness increases the probability of Blocker language by 24 
percent while the probit model differed significantly, suggesting that contract stickiness adds to 
the probability of inclusion by only 1.7 percent, all other variables fixed at the mean. While 
significant, this finding does not support my thesis. I hypothesized that the presence of a prior 
Blocker would induce borrowers to keep the language in future contracts, as the ink cost of 
negotiating the lender protective clause out may be prohibitive. My findings suggest that the 
presence of stickiness only increases the probability of Blocker language by 24 percent, which 
indicates that Blockers are negotiated out of 76 percent of contracts that previously included the 
language. This finding suggests perhaps another interpretation: that Blocker language is an 
important negotiating point, and that the benefit borrowers accrue from excluding this 
provision is perceived ex ante to be higher than the cost they incur in doing so. This finding 
seems to be in line with Ganglmair and Wardlaw (2017), who strongly reject the existence of 
boilerplate language. It also may suggest that Choi et al. (2020) present an overstated opinion on 
the level of encrustation present within bond contracts, indicating that bond lawyers are less of 
an assembly worker and more of an artisan when it comes to drafting debt documents.17 
Another explanation may be that encrustation within debt documents is still significant as Choi 
et al. (2020) suggest, however the encrustation is found in another part of the contract.18 The 
increased rate of negotiation may also align with the Coates et al. (2019) finding, which suggests 
that greater lender protective clauses lead to a higher rate of incompletion. In other words, 
lenders may not have as much negotiating power as previously hypothesized, despite half the 
sample occurring during one of the greatest economic contractions in history. This 
interpretation seems to contradict my finding that a contracting credit environment is correlated 
with greater lender negotiating power. Perhaps a weaker credit environment is still tied to 
greater lender negotiating power, but less than I previously hypothesized. 
The link between law firm relationship and inclusion of Blocker language is statistically 
significant, although I hesitate to place emphasis on this variable due to the noisiness of the 
search and the lack of observations. Just 35 percent of firms within the dataset had law firm 
observations, meaning that 65 percent did not. Additionally, law firm information is observed 
 
17 I acknowledge that bonds and loans are not the same type of debt instrument, but it may be reasonably 
assumed that the Choi et al. (2020) finding applies to loans as it does to bonds. 
18 I draw this hypothesis from a conversation with a retired bond lawyer, who told me that, “A credit 
agreement has 120 pages in it. The real meat is in the covenants… 50-60 pages are what makes a contract 
a good contract. The other stuff is what is boilerplate.” Interview on 28 September 2020. 
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2.3 times more frequently in debt documents that sample Blocker language than in documents 
not containing the language. The association is likely nothing more than random chance. Due to 
this anomaly, the probit model found Law Info to be mildly significant (p<0.10). Law Info’s 
significance seriously undermines the validity of Top Law’s significance. I do not place much 
explanatory power on this variable due to its construction and minimal economic significance.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this study, I seek to understand what factors influence the inclusion of Blocker 
language in debt documents. I take motivation from capital structure and agency cost theory, 
contract completeness and complexity theory, credit cycle theory, and professional network 
theory, hypothesizing that private equity backing, a contractual credit environment, contract 
stickiness and professional legal networks all contribute to the likelihood of Blocker inclusion. I 
find that all key independent variables are associated with a higher chance of including Blocker 
language in a debt document.  
While all variables are statistically significant and positively correlated with the 
inclusion of Blocker language, I find that both an OLS and probit regression of the variables 
yields little true economic significance. In my OLS regression, private equity backing increases 
the likelihood of Blocker inclusion by just 0.84 percent. A contractual credit environment 
increased Blocker likelihood by 1.26 percent. Stickiness, the variable serving as a proxy for ink 
cost and encrustation, had the highest economic and statistical significance, although an OLS 
interpretation of the results still provides unclear real-world implications. Presence of sticky 
language increased Blocker likelihood by 24.02 percent. Finally, inclusion of an innovative legal 
network increased inclusion probability by 0.15 percent. The results from my private equity 
backing, contractual credit environment and legal network variables are all in line with my 
hypothesis. Contract stickiness, while significant, is not consistent with my hypothesis. The lack 
of explanatory power associated with all key independent variables may be explained in part by 
downward bias from the low number of Blocker observations relative to the number of non-
Blocker observations. 
While this paper broke ground on academic research related to J. Crew Maneuvers, 
much more work is yet to be done. I recommend that a professional with legal training conduct 
a more in-depth count of the number of Blockers outstanding. If it is confirmed that only 
roughly 80 such Blockers exists, perhaps it is better to leave future Blocker analysis for a time 
when more observations are available. The model can be improved by incorporating more 
indicators of financial distress, credit cycles, stickiness, and professional networks. For example, 
a future researcher may take the advice of Ganglmair and Wardlaw (2017), who suggest that 
contract length is an accurate proxy for default risk and complexity. Future studies may also 
focus on refining the Top Law variable to have more complete information on law firm, 
especially for lender law firms, rather than borrower law firms. It may also be hypothesized that 
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the decision to negotiate in Blocker language comes from the lender itself, not the lender law 
firm. In this case, future research could study the lender relationship with Blocker inclusion. 
Creating a model to understand the determinants of Blocker language is interesting, but of more 
importance is understanding how Maneuvers should be priced by the market. Due to the low 
number of companies that have engaged in J. Crew Maneuvers, more time will need to pass to 
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